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Abstract
This chapter examines the key role of blame management and avoidance
in crisis communication with particular reference to developing countries
and areas that frequently experience volcanic episodes and disasters. In
these contexts, the chapter explores a key paradox prevalent within crisis
communication and blame management concepts that has been rarely
tested in empirical terms (see De Vries 2004; Brändström 2016a). In
particular, the chapter examines, what it calls, the ‘paradox of frequency’
where frequency of disasters leads to twin dispositions for crisis framed as
either: (i) policy failure (active about volcanic blame on others), where
issues of blame for internal incompetency takes centre stage, and blame
management becomes a focus of disaster managers, and/or: (ii) as event
failure (in this case, the blaming of lack of external capacity on active
volcanoes and thereby the blame avoidance of disaster managers). Put
simply, the authors investigate whether perceptions of frequency itself is a
major determinant shaping the existence, operation, and even perceived
success of crisis communication in developing regions, and countries
experiencing regular disaster episodes. The authors argue frequency is
important in shaping the behaviour of disaster managers and rather
ironically as part of crisis communication can shape expectations of
community resilience and (non)-compliance. In order to explore the
implications of the ‘paradox of frequency’ further, the chapter examines
the case of the Cameroon, where volcanic activity and events have been
regular, paying particular attention to the major disasters in 1986
(Lake Nyos Disaster - LND) and 1999 (Mount Cameroon volcanic
eruption - MCE).
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1 Introduction
Many parts of the world today suffer from a
combination of high vulnerability to, and fre-
quency of, natural hazards. In some instances,
this is because geological factors, such as the
existence of tectonic plate lines, result in repeated
occurrence of earthquakes, tremors, or volcanic
eruptions. In the Philippines, for example, the
complexity of geographical and geological fac-
tors prompts a ‘diversity of hazards’ from
earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, to typhoons
and flash flooding. Yet, any frequency of recur-
ring natural hazards does not automatically lead
to efﬁcient and successful emergency planning or
disaster management. Even the experienced can
be caught out by the unexpected, leading to
public and media blame, and accusations of ‘in-
competency’, amidst government claims of
insufﬁcient capacity or ‘incapacity’ (Wooster
et al. 2005). Within this mix, developing effec-
tive crisis communication remains a constant
challenge, especially in the management of
expectations, and the avoidance of blame
(Brandström 2016a, b). Indeed, debates about
incompetency and/or incapacity are often heard
in economically developing countries, and thus
were resilience capacity is still evolving (Cutter
et al. 2008).
The chapter examines three aspects. First, it
explores the key relationship between crisis
communication and blame avoidance and man-
agement in the context of volcanoes within
developing countries and regions. Second, it
introduces the concept of a ‘Paradox of Fre-
quency’. Thirdly, it discusses the case study of
Cameroon where a major geological volcanic
line, characterized by active and comparatively
regular volcanic and gas activity has clearly
evidenced issues of crisis communication, blame
management and the ‘Paradox of Frequency’.
2 Crisis Communication and Blame
Management: Balancing Meaning
Making, Framing and Blame
Games
2.1 Meaning-Making
As Boin et al. (2005: 82) argues, meaning mak-
ing in crisis and disasters ‘is not just a matter of
following existing contingency plans or imple-
menting strategic choices at the outset of a crisis.
It entails intuitive and improvised public com-
munication by leaders who are suddenly cast into
the hectic pace of crisis reporting’. Disaster
managers and their political masters must
develop integrated ‘framing’ of crisis communi-
cation that successfully embodies, on the one
hand, response and recovery imperatives with a
strategy for the restoration and continuity of
economic activity, and on the other hand, busi-
ness and national interests.
A frame is then a shared construction of
reality, and likewise, framing activity covers both
the use and the impact of frames. As Boin et al.
(2005: 88) highlights, framing represents ‘the
production of facts, images and spectacles aimed
at manipulating the perception and reaction to a
crisis’, and typically involves selective exploita-
tion of data and arguments. In addition, framing
seeks to build (public) conﬁdence in ‘more or
less standardised sequences’ and processes so
that participants feel part of disaster planning
working towards their own key interests (Boin
et al. 2005).
Meaning making can also, however, involve
‘masking’ where disaster managers conceal
and/or downplay aspects of a disaster (to reduce
the long term impacts) during and after crises.
Above all, the outcome of successful meaning
making should be avoidance, limitation, and
control of ‘blame games’ representing the
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‘struggle between protagonists inside and outside
government about the allocation of responsibility
for negative events’ (Brändström et al. 2008:
114).
2.2 Blame-Gaming
Blame management is often seen as being about
blame avoidance or at least managing and con-
trolling blame-gaming. Blame games can be seen
as situations where leaders (but could be exten-
ded to entities) protect their own self-interests by
projecting negative aspects of the crisis onto
other actors. The attribution of blame can be a
major occupation of disaster managers and their
policy leaders during a disaster, seeking to avoid
or shape future accountability. Boin et al. (2010:
706) argues ‘something or somebody must be
blamed—for causing the crisis, failing to prevent
it, or inadequately responding to it’, pointing to
the fact that the ‘tragedy’ of disaster as an ‘Act of
God’ or ‘beyond management’ is no longer seen
as a publically or socially acceptable explanation
for a crisis. There has to be allocation of blame
(Brändström and Kuipers 2003: 291).
For disaster managers, the incentive to inflate
or diminish blame could be incentivized by a
perceived threat of future demotion or dismissal
or even by future progression and promotion
(Boin et al. 2009: 99; Hood 2001: 8). This can be
particularly true in developing countries, where
disaster management frameworks may not be that
well developed or resourced, and the pressure
upon individuals may even be more intense.
According to Brändström (2016a: 34), blam-
ing theory assumes that the blaming behavior of
disaster managers and policy leaders is often
determined by three factors—namely (i) the
wider institutional and political conditions under
which blame games occur, (ii) the blame man-
agement strategies that actors employ and,
(iii) the skills used to apply these strategies in the
public arena. In developing countries, the con-
ditions affecting disaster management are quite
challenging—with ﬁnite resources, immature
institutional arrangements, unstable political
conditions, and intense competition between
governmental priorities. In other words, disposi-
tion towards blaming can be heightened princi-
pally because of the very institutional and
political conditions that pertain in developing
countries.
Moreover, the skills of disaster managers can
also be influential, not least because a disaster
provides opportunities to bring out the worst in
people who seek to identify scapegoats in order
to allocate blame (Ewart and McLean 2015:
169). It may also bring out the best in people and
their entrepreneurial skills at times of crisis (see
Miles and Petridou 2015; Miles 2016). Certainly,
within the realms of crisis communication, dis-
aster managers and policy leaders will be skillful
at arming themselves with plentiful explanations
to avoid blame (McGraw 1990: 119). Ewart and
MacLean (2015: 168), for instance, catalogue six
forms of identiﬁable explanations, from blaming
lack of resources; the event itself; previous
administration(s); the number of people and
agencies involved; the delegated agency; or
claiming ignorance to unforeseen consequences.
2.3 Framing
A critical feature within crisis communication is
thus for disaster managers ‘to position themselves
in relation to what caused the event’ (Brändström
2016a: 118) and distinguishing between framing
causality as caused by internal (policy/political)
or external (operational or other) factors. Often an
external frame requires arguing ‘credibly that the
events may or may not have been foreseeable’
and also challenge certainty that events were
preventable or controllable once they had occur-
red. In particular, events affecting vulnerable
disaster zones in developing countries can be
portrayed as ‘forces of nature’—where disaster
managers argue that they ‘cannot prevent them
from happening and rarely are able to control
them when they do’ (Brändström 2016a: 118).
Equally, opponents and critics will attempt to link
operations to the internal workings of disaster
planning, policy and politics.
While there are numerous models for under-
standing blaming behavior and impacts
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(Brändström and Kuipers 2003; Brändström
2016a) certain aspects seem especially relevant
for this chapter. First, there is political/policy
failure (highlighting internal causes, and exam-
ples of individual or multiple mistakes or missed
signals) which can be broadly equated with ‘in-
competency’. Second, there is systemic failure in
relation to external factors—where the disaster
management system cannot cope with the mag-
nitude of the external event and thus there is
‘incapacity’ or ‘incapability’ to act effectively
against such ‘forces of nature’ (adapted from
Brändström 2016a). In this way, blame and
accountability are either internalized or exter-
nalized. Frames indicating whether the events
were foreseeable and controllable internalize
accountability, meaning the blame is allocated to
identiﬁable individuals and their policies.
Whereas frames externalising accountability
allow for disaster managers and policy makers to
avoid blame and policies remain unchanged
(Boin et al. 2009).
Balancing meaning making, framing, and
blame gaming are therefore important for
understanding crisis communication and dealing
with the question of frequency of disasters also.
In addition, managers framing the implications of
the frequency of disasters in speciﬁc ways may
lead to delegation to local actors in developing
countries. Rather ironically, blame management
may, directly or indirectly, facilitate narrative(s)
of resilience in developing countries, where there
is a bigger role for local communities and indi-
viduals doing more when confronted with inef-
fective or reluctant governmental action. In this
way, the pressures of meaning making, framing
and blame management facilitate ofﬁcial, and
often unofﬁcial, delegation of disaster manage-
ment to others.
3 Paradox of Frequency: Policy
Failure as ‘Incompetency’
and Event Failure as ‘Incapacity’
The ‘paradox of frequency’ highlights how fre-
quency can be framed within crisis communica-
tion, and in particular, as a paradoxical situation
where frequency of disasters facilitates twin
dispositions for crisis framing.
First, there is the frame where the frequency
of disaster leads to a stress and expectation on
learning and competence building. Disaster
managers, faced with a regularity of events,
should be able to learn and hone their compe-
tencies in handling such events to a high level.
They can internalise this competency within their
emergency planning and policies, and even
increase their own accountability in terms of
blame management. Conversely, when things go
wrong, the focus will be on blame management
of ‘incompetency’. Blame will often focus on not
meeting expectations of competency and thus
policy failure being strongly associated and
framed as ‘incompetency’. Thus, policy failure in
volcanic crisis communication could be seen as
being active about volcanic blame on disasters
managers and others responsible for community
resilience. Ironically, the existence of learning
leads to assumptions that subsequent inadequacy
to respond equates to incompetence (in not get-
ting on top of problems) which build on rising,
and at times unrealistic, expectations that suc-
cessive disaster experiences internally and pro-
portionately enhance resilience. In this case, the
frequency of disaster events leads to ever more
active volcanic blame management.
Second, there is the frame where the fre-
quency of disasters leads to a stress on the
magnitude, size and regularity of the event and
on blame avoidance on the grounds of ‘inca-
pacity’. In this context, the ramiﬁcations of the
disasters are so regular and/or so large that they
require society and individuals to treat resilience
towards disasters as part of their normal activities
and as ‘business as usual’. They need to do the
best they can at these often frequent, but chal-
lenging times, resulting in limited expectations
on government, and beliefs that recovery times
may be long given the frequency of successive
events. Expectations on government, agencies
and disaster managers should therefore be con-
strained since there is only so much capacity (or
incapacity) that can be provided in handling such
frequent external occurrence. The dominant
frame then is constructed around blaming the
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active volcanoes and not the disaster managers or
policy leaders or even system. Hence, when
things go wrong, it can be framed as simply
‘system failure’ where the frequency and size of
disaster as an external event overwhelms the
capacity of the disaster management system in
place. In simple terms, an event based failure
where there is blame avoidance on the grounds
of ‘incapacity’. Given this line of reasoning, the
frequency of events means that disaster managers
emphasise the importance of blame avoidance on
them since, in operational terms, dispositions are
ﬁrmly centred on blaming the frequent activity of
the respective volcano.
This paradox is all the more important since in
terms of crisis communication, disaster managers
face a key challenge before, during and after
disasters. There is, for example, a tendency for
government agencies to want to both ‘own the
message’ and ‘be the messenger’, especially as
disasters, by deﬁnition, exceed the capacity of
affected communities and thus the public will
look to national or regional leadership for assis-
tance. There is therefore a high propensity for
such agencies—by adopting this approach—to
be open to both blames on grounds of incom-
petence and incapacity simultaneously.
4 Communication Challenges
in the Context of Volcanic Crisis
Management
In theory, disaster managers should do their best
work at crisis communicating in the period
before a disaster, particularly when focusing on
informing, educating and concentrating on
themes such as risk reduction and disaster pre-
vention. Campaigns often use printed leaflets
(Bird et al. 2010), village elder gatherings (Cro-
nin et al. 2004) and radio broadcasts and typi-
cally include schools’ disaster awareness (Ronan
et al. 2010), elderly or disabled social outreach,
and early warning systems (Garcia and Fearnley
2012). Nevertheless, despite such public aware-
ness campaigns, communities often remain
reluctant to engage with government communi-
cation agendas. This may be a result of mistrust
from previous inadequate government actions or
reactions to earlier disasters leading to an abiding
cynicism and uncooperative attitude to subse-
quent public communication strategies (Haynes
et al. 2008). As a result, future disaster related
communications are perceived simply as gov-
ernment propaganda to protect reputation. It is
arguable then whether governments should
always be the sole owner of ‘the message’. Crisis
communication ofﬁcers are thus faced with the
twin challenges of not only having the right
message but also employing the right messenger
(McGuire et al. 2009); it may be necessary to
think about incompetence and incapacity
dynamics both in terms of messaging and in
terms of the messenger when it comes to blame.
Crisis communication in volcanic crisis man-
agement is particularly challenging because vol-
canoes are highly complex scenarios
scientiﬁcally, socially and politically with
potential dire consequences to human, ﬁnancial,
social, physical and natural capital if not handled
properly. This is critical for volcanic crises
management in developing countries because
action is required in uncertain circumstances
where several gaps prevent efﬁcient volcanic risk
management. These include lack of adequate
human resources and weak response structures;
lack of understanding of the vulnerability of
exposed elements; lack of assessment of vulner-
ability and community resilience or the capacity
to recover after a catastrophe; lack of under-
standing of the vulnerability of exposed elements
and generally weak disaster risk management
frameworks (Bang 2014; MIAVITA 2012).
This complexity in communication (Fig. 1) is
not made any easier by the fact that undertaking
volcanic risk, hazard and vulnerability assess-
ment ideally requires engagement of scientiﬁc
agencies with diverse expertise (Brändström
2016a; Smale 2016; MIAVITA 2012; UN 1995),
as well as the integration of information flows
from stakeholders at the local, regional and
national levels. Signiﬁcant gaps remain in com-
munication and information flows in volcanic
crisis management in many parts of the world,
including the Cameroon, which are prone to
volcanic hazard risks. One commonly
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identiﬁable problem remains the transmission
and translation of scientiﬁc early warning and
monitoring, whereby: (i) scientiﬁc monitoring is
regular, providing not only constant information
about the hazard to disaster managers or
decision-makers, but: (ii) critical assessment that
also feeds into key public communications,
warnings and/or instructions on the level and
kinds of actions to be taken (Volcano Observa-
tory 2016; Smale 2016). Arguably, the former is
well developed for a few hundred of the world’s
active volcanoes (Simkin and Siebert 1994; UN
1995), while the latter is often poorly developed
or absent, inadequate and/or ineffective (San-
derson 1998; Clay et al. 1999; Kokelar 2002).
5 Volcanic Hazards
in the Cameroon
Cameroon is prone to natural hazards mainly due
to a geologic/topographic feature in the country
known as the Cameroon Volcanic Line
(CVL) (Fig. 2). For this chapter, the 1600 km long
CVL also ﬁts the criteria offrequency, with regular
occurrence of landslides, floods, earth tremors,
toxic gas emissions (as happened in 1984 and 1986
in LakeMonoum andLakeNyos respectively) and
frequent volcanic eruptions. Located on the CVL,
is Mt. Cameroon/Fako, the largest, most active
Fig. 1 Methodological framework with related information flows for managing volcanic events. Source MIAVITA
(2012: 17)
Fig. 2 The Cameroon Volcanic Line (dashed yellow
line). Source Favalli et al. (2012: 424)
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volcano in West and Central Africa (Kling et al.
1987; Duruelle et al. 1987; Fitton 1987; Freeth and
Kay 1987;Bang 2012, 2013), having erupted eight
times in the 20th century andmost recently in 2012
(Global Volcanism Program 2012). The historical
record of Mt. Cameroon shows an average period
of 17 years (Njome et al. 2010) between succes-
sive eruptions. Moreover, Mt. Cameroon is also
notable due to its size as an elliptical volcano,
straddling the continental margin at the bottom of
the Gulf of Guinea in the South West Region
(SWR) of Cameroon (Fig. 3), and with a height of
4095 m above sea level and an area of about
3000 km2.
Generally, Mt. Cameroon is characterised by
three types of eruptions: explosive types, mod-
erately explosive types (that have built the cinder
cones) and effusive types, which are responsible
for lava flows (Tchoua 1971; Tsafack et al. 2009).
Voluminous lava flow, rather than pyroclastic
materials is the greatest threat from Mt. Camer-
oon, often from summit and flank eruptions (Pyle
1999). Recent studies, mapping the risk of lava
flow inundation (Fig. 4) and other hazards around
Mt. Cameroon (Bonne et al. 2008; Thierry et al.
2008; Favalli et al. 2012; Wantim et al. 2013),
highlight the notable vulnerability of the two
biggest towns, and largest population centres in
the region. Buea town (90,000 people)—capital
of the SWR and administrative headquarters, and
Limbe town (85,000 people)—the main tourist
town situated along the Atlantic coast, and other
villages closer to the Volcano are susceptible to
inundation by lava flow. Crisis communication is
very important given that there is signiﬁcant risk
to strategic and critical buildings essential to
disaster management located in Buea, the capital
and regional headquarters of the SWR, and
located at the foot of Mt. Cameroon. It should
also be noted that such vulnerability also applies
to earthquakes and landslides since both felt and
instrumentally recorded earthquakes have been
documented with the vast majority along or close
to the CVL, and largely concentrated in the Mt.
Cameroon region (Ateba and Tabod 2009). Vol-
canic eruptions are usually preceded/or accom-
panied by volcanic and tectonic earthquakes,
indicating that earthquake monitoring remains
very important for predicting MCEs.
In terms of crisis communication in the
Cameroon, several aspects are also important.
First, although the area was seismically active
prior to the 1999 eruption, there was no extensive
pre-warning or early warning system in place to
Fig. 3 Map showing Lava flows produced during erup-
tions of Mt. Cameroon in the 20th century (red areas),
and towns and villages in the region (crosshatched areas).
Source Favalli et al. (2012: 424)
Fig. 4 Lava flow hazard map around Mt. Cameroon
volcano. Source Favalli et al. (2012: 432)
Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame? … 7
warn the population of the threat—severely
reducing crisis communication. Secondly, the
frequency of volcanic eruptions and the impor-
tance of earthquake monitoring have led to some
developments in the Cameroon. In the Mt.
Cameroon region, for example, the ﬁrst network
of six permanent seismic stations was setup in
1984. Thirdly, the extensiveness of the moni-
toring has varied at differing points in time. After
the Lake Nyos Disaster (LND) in 1986, seismic
monitoring of Mt. Cameroon was extended to the
region on the Oku Volcanic ﬁeld where Lake
Nyos is situated. However, prior to the 1999 and
2000 eruptions, all but one of the sensors was
working, due to lack of maintenance (Ateba et al.
2009). The number of seismic stations was
increased after the 1999, and 2000 eruptions,
culminating in 32 broadband stations being
installed (2005–07) over the CVL and the Congo
Craton. All the stations, however, were disman-
tled in 2007 because they were not operational,
except for two, one in Ekona at the foot of Mt.
Cameroon and the other in Yaounde (Ateba and
Tabod 2009). The volcano is now monitored
using a network of six telemeter seismic broad-
band stations that detect the magnitude and
location of earthquakes, and data is processed at
a monitoring centre, located at Ekona not far
from Buea (Lenhardt and Oppenheimer 2014).
Fourthly, the crisis management framework of
the Cameroon is relatively new, with most of the
signiﬁcant developments after the 1999/2000
volcanic eruptions. Clear institutional structures,
including communications have been attempted,
with volcanic crisis management falling under
the remit of civil protection. The government
retains the primary responsibility, and has insti-
tuted a national policy on crises management that
recognises a multi-agency, interdisciplinary and
inter-cooperation. The nodal coordinating agency
for civil protection is the Department/Directorate
of Civil Protection (DCP) in the powerful
Ministry of Territorial Administration and
Decentralisation (MTAD). Most notably, a
multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach to
natural and other hazards has been operational
only since 2005. This is supported by govern-
mental legislation setting out a general national
strategy for risk reduction and disaster manage-
ment that includes a National Risk Observatory,
and emphases three phases of pre-crisis, disaster
response and recovery/rehabilitation—all of
which stress the importance of information flows
and crisis communication (Bang 2012, 2014).
There is also a National Disaster Prevention and
Management Programme, which ideally, should
liaise with the DCP in coordinating all the local,
regional, national and international stakeholders
in disaster management, and envisages a decen-
tralised structure where authority lies with chief
government administrators in these administra-
tive divisions, who double as the main
crisis/disaster managers (Bang 2014). Yet as
Bang (2014) notes, these policies are only as
good as they appear since most have not been
implemented in volcanic crisis situations in
recent decades.
6 Crisis Communication: The Case
of the 1999 Eruption of Mt.
Cameroon
The 28 March–22 April 1999 eruption of Mt.
Cameroon is well documented. Although the
Cameroon’s scientists and authorities were aware
that the volcano was indeed active, the actual
eruption took everyone by surprise. In terms of
crisis communication when the eruption started,
the local community was informed through the
ofﬁcial government run regional state radio in
Buea (CRTV Buea). The eruption, however, was
not forecast in advance and the population was
not pre-warned of any impending eruption,
highlighting the lack of an early warning system
and in tandem, effective crisis communication
strategies.
This was very surprising since reports of
seismic activities leading up to the eruption were
available, and painted a picture of an impending
eruption. The eruption, which started on 28
March, was explosive, emitting gases and pyro-
clastic lava flow. On 30 March, a second vent
opened, releasing huge quantities of lava that
flowed for about 14 km south-southwest towards
the village of Bakingili (Suh et al. 2003). In
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2000, a brief ﬁssure eruption at the summit pro-
duced a lava flow that spread mostly south
eastwards and stopped 4 km from the outskirts of
Buea (Favalli et al. 2012). Fortunately, the lava
flow rate was slow, providing sufﬁcient time for
any ‘at risk’ population on its flow path to be
evacuated.
The effects of the 1999 MCE were reasonably
profound. Fortunately, there were no human
casualties and the damage was mainly restricted
to infrastructure and economic activity. The
magnitude 4 earthquake damaged houses in
Buea, leaving some people homeless. Most
notably the lava flow that moved towards the
coast, particularly the village of Bakingili,
affected over 1000 people including 600 inhabi-
tants of Bakingili village who were subsequently
evacuated; the ﬁrst time ever in the history of
MCEs (Atanga et al. 2010). Luckily, the 10–
12 m thick lava flow narrowly missed Bakingili
village, whose population had been evacuated
just a few days earlier, but severely damaged
infrastructure, and affected the local economy
and tourism resorts of the West Coast. Volcanic
ash affected the coastal villages of Batoke,
Debundsha, Bakingili and Idenau, causing eye
and respiratory problems (Afane et al. 2001). Gas
and ash emissions also polluted drinking water
for about 2600 residents in the area (Atanga et al.
2010). Although there was no human casualty,
the eruption caused a total economic loss esti-
mated at about US$790,000 (Lenhardt and
Oppenheimer 2014).
6.1 Flaws in Crisis Communication
Three observations can be readily made in terms
of the 1999 MCE. Firstly, crisis communication
and early warning was found lacking. In taking
everybody by surprise, the 1999 MCE exposed
flaws in Cameroon’s disaster management sys-
tem, including both scientiﬁc and governmental
lack of preparedness, despite frequency of erup-
tions on Mt. Cameroon. Although various sci-
entiﬁc studies had been carried out prior to 1999,
the Cameroonian authorities had no clear idea of
the level of risks associated with the volcano
(Thierry et al. 2008). In addition, there was no
warning system in place to alert the population.
Although, and following the 1986 LND, a carbon
dioxide detection system was adopted to alert the
population (Bang 2012), a more extensive early
warning system had not been introduced in other
hazard prone regions of the country. Indeed, this
was only put in place on Mt. Cameroon after the
1999 MCE (Thierry et al. 2008). Hence, the
culture of disaster management was reactive, and
did not place sufﬁcient emphasis on preparedness
for natural hazards that the government, scien-
tists and the public recognised were frequent in
the Cameroon. In short, there were ready-made
grounds for claims of incompetency in terms of
blame management. Second, even when emer-
gency management effectively began as part of
the response phase (Fig. 5), the practical reality
was that disaster response was widely dispersed
providing multiple points of confusion and ten-
sion on crisis communication.
From the perspective of crisis communication,
the structure centred on the scientiﬁc committee,
which provided feedback of its monitoring
activities to the governor of the SWR during
daily meetings as the eruption continued. The
meetings were open, attended by members of the
public and the press, who received updates from
the scientists/government and gave interviews to
heads of the committees/chairpersons who con-
sequently updated the public. Although this was
an opportunity to eliminate false rumours or
wrong information (Ateba and Tabod 2009), the
management of the eruption revealed a plethora
of problems. In practice, and as shown in Fig. 5,
a complex array of actors participated in the
disaster management contributing to multiple
information flows and communication. Reports
also suggested a striking lack of coordination in
terms of sharing results and information even
inside the committee, resulting in signiﬁcant
confusion (Ateba and Tabod 2009).
Third, the 1999 experience highlighted that
there were major deﬁciencies in how crisis
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communication fed into and shaped key
decision-making. A good example of this relates
to the speciﬁc case of the evacuation of 600
people from Bakingili Village, which occurred
comparatively late, and was marred by poor
preparations, and revealed many communication
problems. Although the lava flow had been
approaching the village for weeks, evacuation
was not considered a priority, regardless of the
fact that scientists monitoring the eruption had
warned of the threat to the local population in the
area. If the lava flow speed was faster, it would
have reached Bakingili village before the evac-
uation. The authorities were divided about whe-
ther to inform people living on the SW flank of
the Mountain that lava flow was a threat to their
settlements because of fear of panic, which nei-
ther the national nor regional authorities were
sufﬁciently prepared to handle. Simultaneously,
there were radio, TV and media announcements,
reassuring the villagers that any dangers were
minimal and urging the population to ‘stay vig-
ilant’, directly contradicting messages from
scientists monitoring the eruption who had
identiﬁed that the village was along the flow path
of the lava, and there was no sign of the eruption
stopping soon. Moreover, ﬁeld scientists close to
Bakingili were warning the villagers of the dan-
ger, resulting in an overall picture where the local
residents were getting different messages and
mixed signals from various media. When the
decision was ﬁnally taken to evacuate the resi-
dents of Bakingili village due to fear of a pos-
sible inundation by the lava flow, the confusion
and delay meant that the temporary camps hastily
built in Tiko, some 40 km away, lacked basic
provision and/or facilities for emergency relief
operations. This prompted anger amongst the
relocated villagers, who subsequently blamed the
government for lack of readiness, inadequate
resourcing, and/or an unwillingness to ade-
quately cater for their needs in the camps. The
consequence was mistrust and miscommunica-
tion between the communities, local scientists
and emergency managers (Atanga et al. 2010;
Njome et al. 2010).
KEY
PRIME MINISTER
Ministry of Territorial 
Administration 
Decentralisation
MINRESI
Ministry of 
Higher
Education 
Ministry of 
Public
Health
Ministry of 
Social
Affairs
Ministry of 
Communication
Ministry of 
Defense MIMITDDCP
Governor of 
South West 
Region
TV, RadioState & Private News Papers
IRGM
National 
Risk
Observatory
Universities
Relevant 
Faculties
Relevant 
Department
Preventive 
and Clinical 
Medicine 
Section
Directorate 
of Geology
Local Crisis 
Management 
Commitee
DCP= Directorate of Civil Protection—Central Agency Responsible for Coordinating Civil Protection in Cameroon 
MIMITD= Ministry of Industry, Mines and Technological Development
MINRESI=Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation
IRGM=Institute of Geologic and Mining Research—Geophysical and Volcanological Unit
                        Direction of Power Structure
                        Different channels of Risk Communication 
 ir t r t  f i il r t ti tr l  s si l  f r r i ti  i il r t ti  i  r  
I I  i istr  f I str , i s  l i l l t
I I i istr  f i tifi  s r   I ti
I I stit t  f l i   i i  s r si l  l l i l it
                        ir ti  f r tr t r
                        iff r t ls f is  i ti  
Technical/Scientific Aspectsi l/ i tifi  tSocial/Cultural Aspectsi l/ lt r l t
Fig. 5 Organisational structure for the management of the 1999 Mt. Cameroon eruption. Source Authors, adapted from
Ateba and Tabod (2009: 45)
10 L. Miles et al.
6.2 Blame Gaming and Blame
Avoidance
From the blame perspective, several aspects were
evident. First, blame in terms of ‘incompetency’
was directed at the authorities and identiﬁed the
lack of preparedness including any emergency
plan to evacuate people. This was largely framed
as apportioning blame for internal policy failure
and incompetence given the threat posed by lava
flow in the region was already known from
previous eruptions. The blame associated with
such internal incompetency and policy failure far
outstripped the ability of disaster managers to use
blame avoidance strategies based on incapacity
and system failure due to the magnitude of
external events. In addition, communication on
the rate of the advancing flows was not regarded
as essential by the authorities, who stressed that
prior eruptions had not threatened a settlement in
the region before. Although the lava flow rate
towards the SW coast was being regularly com-
municated by scientists to the authorities, nothing
was forecast or reported for the ash fall, which
caused health hazards affecting many communi-
ties. Above all, even as the eruption unfolded, the
population in the region was not warned at any
stage that this health hazard existed. Hence, the
framing and blaming of incompetency was also
associated with very poor communication man-
agement by the authorities with the local indi-
genes (Atanga et al. 2010). Compounding this
was the setting up of temporary evacuation
camps to host the displaced population that
lacked basic facilities. Finally, the delay in the
ﬁnal decision to evacuate ‘at risk’ populations,
and its then slow transmission to the local pop-
ulation is indicative of incompetence. Here, the
authorities were blamed for inept
decision-making, incompetent policy implemen-
tation and poor communication framed as policy
rather than event failure, particularly in relation
to the delay in the evacuation of Bakingili
residents.
Framing and blaming of ‘incompetency’
compounded, what Atanga et al. (2010) has
identiﬁed as a culture of limited or
non-compliance among the Cameroonian
villages and settlements. Since the villagers had
never been informed of scientiﬁc studies about
risks on Mt. Cameroon, there was a reluctance to
accept evacuation orders from the government
notwithstanding the strong community support
for enhanced crisis communication. Villagers
strongly viewed effective crisis communication
as the best way to enhance further and optimal
co-operation with the government, including
executing strategies, which would strengthen
community resilience. Above all, the 1999
eruption also highlighted the need to integrate
emergency planning with respect for local cus-
toms in order to avoid conflicts, which had
bearing on attitudes towards compliance. Here
crisis communication was also deemed to play a
key role; principally in providing feedback on
governmental planning and implementation.
Following this line of reasoning, modern infor-
mation dissemination methods need to be
accompanied by and integrated with
local/traditional methods to facilitate crisis com-
munication; for example, use of the village’s
traditional announcement system—‘the gong’,1
to facilitate information flow in the event of an
emergency.
7 Discussion and Conclusions:
Cameroon and the Paradox
of Frequency
The experience of the 1999 Mt. Cameroon
eruption leaves us with several important obser-
vations regarding the ‘paradox of frequency’.
First, the lack of contingency emergency plan for
a frequent event like an eruption reinforces
blames framing centred on incompetency rather
than incapacity. Second, the 1999 eruption
highlights the importance of factoring in the
cultural perception of MCEs. The local tribes
around the mountain, for instance, believe erup-
tions are caused by the mountain God (Epasa
Moto). Consequently, when he is angry, their
1The gong is s traditional instrument, which when played
or sounded; everyone is alerted and comes out to get a
message.
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tribal chief offers sacriﬁces to appease ‘Epasa
Moto’ to prevent the destruction of their villages
(Atanga et al. 2010; Njome et al. 2010). Volcanic
eruptions on Mt. Cameroon thus forms part of
the cultural fabric of the communities, affecting
the perception of volcanic hazard among
indigenous populations and thus the role of
government in mitigating, preparing and
responding to it. It is also appropriate to factor
such narratives into crisis communication in
order to contextualise messaging, facilitate
compliance and develop community resilience
and orderly volcanic hazard response among
communities around the mountain.
Third, the experience of the 1999/2000 vol-
canic eruptions showed how little has been learnt
and embedded from the previous experience of
the LND of the 1980s. Functions were duplicated
and ﬁnancial and material destined for the dis-
aster survivors were embezzled (Bang 2012).
There were problems with inadequate needs
assessments of the disaster survivors. Similarly,
in 1999, no staff from the Ministry of Health sat
on the crisis committee to provide advice on
health risks from the eruption thereby demon-
strating deﬁciencies in learning about the role of
scientiﬁc advice in shaping crisis
communication.
According to Bang (2012), part of the reason
for this lack of learning—in spite of the fre-
quency of disasters—was that there was a nota-
ble lack of follow-up projects on the social
aspects of the LND. Disaster managers failed to
learn from internal policy failure and thereby
how to turn incompetency into practical com-
petency via lessons learned or at least counter
accusation of incompetency via more sophisti-
cated communication strategies. In fact, gov-
ernment ofﬁcials used framing strategies
emphasising the external nature and magnitude
of the LND and the later MCE events in a quick,
but largely futile, attempt to shift criticisms about
policy failures in the management of the crisis
from themselves. They highlighted a ‘systemic
failure’ narrative, where they attempted blame
avoidance by highlighting the poor ﬁnancial state
of the country, combined with the magnitude of
external natural events.
Other factors can be explained by concepts of
blame management. Field observations by Bang
reveal also that the political context is important in
the Cameroon case. Government authorities and
ofﬁcials appointed to manage the various admin-
istrative units of the country—who also double as
disaster managers—usually behaved to
protect/defend their jobs/positions rather than
acceptingmistakes. Equally, they were resistant to
delegating to others more knowledgeable in crisis
management to take control, because they might
be sympathisers of opposition parties and may
take credit for any good job done (Bang 2012).
As a conclusion, there is empirical evidence
that demonstrates that frequency of events is not
a guarantee of effective learning and enhanced
preparedness for the future. Later blame and
blame gaming will continue especially since
issues of competency remains at the fore even
today in the Cameroon. Issues, such as, lack of
political resolve or will, and inadequacy of
human and ﬁnancial resources (Bang 2014)
remain as relevant today—suggesting that fre-
quency of occurrence is not necessarily the main
factor determining levels of preparedness and
resilience. At the very least there needs to be
continuous commitment and political will as part
of the ‘bouncing forwards’ that embodies a quest
for change, improvement and innovation (Miles
2016). Learning and review of experience must
therefore accompany frequency of events. Sim-
ply experiencing frequent events will not auto-
matically lead to effectiveness in handling those
events. Only by incorporating more sophisticated
ideas of crisis communication can any resistance
to learning from previous disasters be addressed
within Cameroon’s disaster management system.
There is no time to waste. One thing the paradox
of frequency tells us—is that time will not wait
until the next disaster is upon the Cameroon.
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